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Light on a Darkling Plain: Intercircuit Conflicts
in the Perspective of Time and Experience
Arthur D. Hellman
Abstract
The time has long passed when the Supreme Court resolved every intercircuit
conflict properly brought before it in a petition for certiorari. Is that a problem we
should be concerned about? Three decades ago, Congress asked the Federal Judicial
Center, the research arm of the federal judiciary, to conduct a study to ascertain “the
number and frequency of conflicts among the judicial circuits … that remain unresolved
because they are not heard by the Supreme Court.” Congress further requested that
the Center determine the extent to which the unresolved conflicts are “intolerable.”
The Center asked me to design and conduct the study. The study found that although
the number of unresolved conflicts was larger than previous studies had suggested, the
numbers alone gave a distorted picture of the phenomenon. Most of the conflicts that
the Supreme Court does not hear either do not generate any of the consequences that
might make them “intolerable” or do so only for a short period of time.
Subsequently, I undertook another empirical study of unresolved intercircuit
conflicts. It contained two elements. First, I investigated the later history of the conflicts
identified in the initial project. Second and more ambitiously, I carried out a unique
program of field research that included individual and group interviews of attorneys,
examination of continuing legal education materials, and an in-depth survey of members
of two specialty bars.
This article reports the results of this later research. The principal conclusion is
that the problem of unresolved conflicts exists only if you look for it—and look for it in
a certain way. If you concentrate your attention on individual court of appeals decisions
that create conflicts and on individual denials of certiorari in conflict cases, you will see
(in the words of Chief Justice Rehnquist) “a judicial ‘darkling plain’ where ignorant
armies [clash] by night.” But if you look at the conflict issues over a period of time and
in context, you will find, if not certitude, a landscape in which courts build upon and
reexamine one another's decisions in the untidy but constructive tradition of the
common law..
The field research also suggests a broader point. The very language that we use to
talk about conflicts may convey a misleading picture of what is going on. We say that an
“issue” gives rise to a “conflict” that the Supreme Court “resolves” (or does not
“resolve”). This language implies that the dimensions of the “issue” remain unchanged
from the first decision through consideration by two or more courts of appeals and
ultimate resolution by the Supreme Court. The implication is probably correct when the
issue is binary and discrete – for example, the “Cartwright issue” (whether mutual fund
shares in a decedent’s estate are to be valued at the bid price or the asked price). For
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other issues, however, the reality will not be so straightforward. Judges and lawyers may
continue to frame the issue in the same words, but beneath the verbal identity may lie
important differences in the propositions that are accepted as part of the legal landscape
and those that are viewed as litigable. Similarly, when the Supreme Court does
intervene, its decision may end up reshaping the framework for litigation and counseling
about an issue rather than closing a chapter in the particular area of the law.
This pattern can be viewed as a departure from the traditional model of
lawmaking by appellate courts. In that model, as memorably described by Lord
Mansfield, the law “works itself pure from case to case.” In the situation I have just
outlined, the law never “works itself pure;” rather, uncertain boundaries and gray areas
characterize the legal landscape as long the issue, in some form, remains alive.
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